

D. Development of the Doctrine

1. Relevant theological consideration

Thomas Aquinas, in Book One, Chapter 29 of his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, sets forth the concept of the analogy of being between God and creatures. God and His creatures belong to two wholly unique orders of being. As a result, Thomas sets forth the concept of the analogy of knowing in Chapters 32-34. Chapter 32 is entitled "That nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things"; Chapter 33 is entitled "That not all names are said of God and creatures in a purely equivocal way"; and Chapter 34 is entitled

"That names said of God and creatures are said analogically." His reasoning is excerpted as follows:

Chapter 32

(1) It is thereby evident that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things.

(2)... the forms of the things God has made do not measure up to a specific likeness of the divine power; for the things that God has made receive in a divided and particular way that which in Him is found in a simple and universal way. It is evident, then, that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things....

(7)... nothing is predicated of God and creatures as though they were in the same order, but, rather, according to priority and posteriority. For all things are predicated of God essentially. For God is called being as being entity itself, and He is called good as being goodness itself. But in other beings predications are made by participation, as Socrates is said to be a man, not because he is humanity itself, but because he possesses humanity. It is impossible, therefore, that anything be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Chapter 33

(3)... where there is pure equivocation, there is no likeness in things themselves; there is only the unity of a name. But, as is clear from what we have said, there is a certain mode of likeness of things to God. It remains, then, that names are not said of God in a purely equivocal way.

(4) Moreover, when one name is predicated of several things in a purely equivocal way, we cannot from one of them be led to the knowledge of another; for the knowledge of things does not depend on words, but on the meaning of names. Now, from what we find in other things, we do arrive at a knowledge of divine things, as is evident from what we have said. Such names, then, are not said of God and other things in a purely equivocal way.

(6) It is also a fact that a name is predicated of some being uselessly unless through that name we understand something